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In 2019, the Supreme Court will get its latest bite at the Takings Clause apple when it hears the case of Knick v.
Township of Scott.[2] The metaphor from the preceding sentence—commonly used to symbolize a person or
entity getting a second chance at something—is appropriate in a variety of ways for purposes of the Knick case.
On the surface, the Court is hearing the case for a second time on re-argument this Spring and allowing the
metaphor to stand.[3] Digging deeper however, the substantive issue at hand in Knick also calls upon the
aforementioned metaphor; more on that in a moment.
The facts in Knick are fairly straightforward: Plaintiff, Rose Mary Knick, is a resident of the Township of Scott,
which passed an ordinance declaring that “all cemeteries within the Township . . . be kept open and accessible
to the general public during daylight hours . . . ,” that no property owner may unreasonably restrict access to
such cemeteries, and that government o cials may enter the property at any time to determine if a cemetery is
on the property.[4] An o cial did just that on Knick’s property, entering without a warrant,  nding what the
o cial believed to be a cemetery, and subsequently declaring Knick to be in violation of the ordinance.[5] In her
lawsuit, she prominently argued that the ordinance amounts to a taking of her property, thus requiring “just
compensation” under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[6] However, to Knick’s chagrin,
her suit was tossed out of Federal Court at the District level for failing to satisfy what is known as the
“Williamson County Doctrine.”[7]
The Doctrine is a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.[8] In that case, the Court essentially held that “if a State provides an adequate
procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.”[9] At  rst blush, this
decision seems to still allow Ms. Knick to obtain relief by simply heading to State Court, and seek a remedy.
What is implicit in the doctrine and the preceding quotation, however, is that if a plaintiff does indeed go to
State Court and is denied just compensation, then that plaintiff may head to Federal Court to determine if a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause has occurred.[10] Yet herein lies the functional issue: once a plaintiff
like Knick has sought a remedy at the State Court level and lost, that plaintiff is precluded under Res Judicata
from then  ling a claim in Federal Court.[11] Thus, the plaintiff cannot have the proverbial second bite of the
apple, a phrase by which the rationale for preclusion is oft described.[12]
At present, Knick argues that this practice and remedial regime denies her access to Federal Courts, in turn
preventing her and other plaintiffs from seeking Federal relief from potential violations of their Federal
Constitutional rights.[13] Essentially, the Knick argument is that the Williamson County Doctrine and its progeny
close the Federal courthouse doors for takings clause claims against state and local governments.[14]
Therefore, the Supreme Court should accept these arguments and overrule the Williamson County Doctrine to
allow potential litigants to choose their forum in a manner consistent with all other Constitutional litigants,
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because as scholars have noted, no other Constitutional rights are treated this way, rendering certain Takings
Clause litigants to second class status.[15]
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